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This paper studies gender differences in the allocation of workers across tasks of 
different complexity using panel data from a representative sample of Finnish 
metalworkers during 1990- 2000. Finnish metal industry data provide a continuous 
measure of the complexity of the worker’s tasks that can be used to construct a 
complexity ladder of jobs. We study whether women have to pass a higher produc-
tivity threshold to be promoted to more complex tasks. Gender differences in 
promotion rates, duration to promotion, and productivity among promoted and not 
promoted workers are estimated. It is found that women move up the ladder less 
than men, women have to wait longer to get promoted, and that women are on 
average more productive than men in the groups of both promoted and not-
promoted workers. These productivity differentials are not observed within tasks at 
the initial task assignment. We interpret this as evidence on higher female promotion 
thresholds. 
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Abstract
This paper studies gender diﬀerences in the allocation of workers across tasks of diﬀerent
complexity using panel data from a representative sample of Finnish metalworkers during 1990-
2000. Finnish metal industry data provide a continuous measure of the complexity of the worker’s
tasks that can be used to construct a complexity ladder of jobs. We study whether women have to
pass a higher productivity threshold to be promoted to more complex tasks. Gender diﬀerences
in promotion rates, duration to promotion, and productivity among promoted and not-promoted
workers are estimated. It is found that women move up the ladder less than men, women have
to wait longer to get promoted, and that women are on average more productive than men in
the groups of both promoted and not-promoted workers. These productivity diﬀerentials are not
observed within tasks at the initial task assignment. We interpret this as evidence on higher
female promotion thresholds.
1 Introduction
The gender wage gap is a persistent phenomenon. Even in economies where the female
participation rate has been relatively high for decades and where the experience on anti-
discriminatory legislation is long, women tend to earn lower wages. An important part of
the gender wage gap is explained by occupational segregation. It is common to ﬁnd that
when one controls for suﬃciently narrow occupational and industrial categories, the gen-
der wage gap is considerably reduced.1 Hence, one of the key elements in understanding
the gender wage gap is the asymmetric allocation of men and women across tasks.
This paper uses panel data on Finnish metalworkers to study gender diﬀerences in the
allocation of workers across tasks of diﬀerent complexity. Our aim is to ﬁnd out whether
the productivity thresholds that women need to pass to be promoted are higher than
those of men. We address this question by examining how promoted and non-promoted
women perform with respect to their male counterparts. This information is then used
to infer whether the male and female promotion thresholds are diﬀerent.
That women should meet higher productivity requirements to be promoted is an
old argument and it has been theoretically formulated by Lazear and Rosen (1990). In
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1their model, the comparative advantage of women in non-market activities makes them
more likely to quit. This means that the promotion of women is costly to the employer.
Consequently, women have to be more productive than men to be promoted.
This result has strong implications. First of all, it is obvious that women will be
less likely to be promoted than men. But if there are no systematic diﬀerences in the
distribution of ability between men and women, this asymmetric promotion threshold
also implies that, within tasks, women will be on average more productive than men after
the promotion decision has taken place. Since the few women who have been promoted
to more demanding tasks have passed a higher productivity threshold, they will of course
be on average more productive than promoted men. On the other hand, the men that
remain in less demanding tasks have failed to meet lower productivity requirements and
are therefore on average less productive than the women who remain in the same task.
The previous empirical literature has almost exclusively concentrated on estimating
gender diﬀerences in the probability of promotion.2 There are studies that use data
from nation-wide surveys like Winter-Ebmer and Zweim¨ uller (1997) with Austrian census
data, McCue (1996) with PSID, and Booth et al (2001) with British Household Panel
Survey. Other authors have used data from a single industry or ﬁrm: Granqvist and
Persson (2002) analyze gender diﬀerences in career mobility in the Swedish retail trade
industry whereas Hersch and Viscusi (1996) focus on one US public utility and Jones and
Makepeace (1996) study workers in a British ﬁnancial institution. A special branch of
literature are the studies on the career advancement of academics like Ginther and Hayes
(1999) and McDowell et al (1999). The common ﬁnding is that women are less likely to
be promoted, although some authors fail to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences.
In this paper, we directly address the question whether women have to be more pro-
ductive than men to be promoted. To our knowledge, this has so far not been studied
in the empirical literature. In fact, the productivity implications of the asymmetric pro-
motion thresholds have been seen as an empirically problematic part of the theory. After
all, it is very rare to ﬁn dt h a tw o m e ne a r nh i g h e rw a g e st h a nm e n ,e v e nw i t h i nn a r r o w l y
deﬁned tasks.
Our idea is to focus on workers who start their career in similar tasks and examine how
the gender productivity diﬀerences among these workers are aﬀected by the promotion
process. If the promotion threshold really is higher for women, the relative productivity
of women should improve as a result of the promotion process - both among workers who
were selected to be promoted and among workers who remain in their initial tasks.
We believe that the Finnish metal industry data are exceptionally suitable for this
kind of analysis. First of all, they provide a continuous measure of the complexity of the
tasks of an individual worker that is valid for both within- and between-ﬁrm comparisons.
In this industry, all the jobs are evaluated according to their complexity by an outside
party, and, on the basis of this evaluation, a minimum wage is attached to each job. We
use these minimum wages to construct a complexity ladder of jobs. Second, the panel
nature of the data allows us to distinguish between initial task assignments and subsequent
promotions. We can therefore compare workers who start their careers in similar kind of
tasks. Finally, the data are rich on the information on diﬀerent compensation schemes
and bonuses based on performance evaluations, so that we do not have to rely on ﬁnal
wages only when measuring individual productivity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we augment the
familiar Lazear and Rosen (1990) model with on-the-job learning in the style of Gibbons
and Waldman (1999) and discuss the basic implications regarding probability of promo-
tion, duration to promotion, and the gender productivity diﬀerences. In the third section,
2Booth et al (2001) and Hersch and Viscusi (1996) also estimate gender diﬀerences in the wage growth
upon promotion. Both ﬁnd that women gain less from promotion than men.
2we discuss the data and the fourth section explains the construction of the complexity
ladder of jobs. We then move on to study the movement of workers on the complexity
ladder. In the ﬁf t hs e c t i o nw eb r i e ﬂy replicate the standard analysis of gender diﬀerences
in the probability of promotion. The most original analysis is reported in section 6. In
that section, we use diﬀerent measures of individual productivity to evaluate the relative
performance of a given group of newly recruited men and women, both before and after
the ﬁrst promotion decisions have taken place. The results are strongly supportive of the
asymmetric thresholds hypothesis. The seventh section concludes.
2 Theoretical background
A classic framework in which to think about gender diﬀerences in promotion outcomes is
the model by Lazear and Rosen (1990). It is a model of optimal promotion decisions where
promoted workers undergo costly training to learn the tasks which they are promoted to.
Training costs play an important role in this model because workers cannot commit to
staying in the ﬁrm. After the promotion decision has been taken, workers leave the ﬁrm if
the value of their outside option exceeds the going wage. The training invested on leaving
w o r k e r si sl o s t .
M e na n dw o m e na r ea s s u m e dt od i ﬀer in their outside options. Because women have
a comparative advantage in non-market activities, their outside options are better than
those of men. Hence, women are more likely to leave the ﬁrm and the risk of losing the
investment in training is higher when promoting a woman than when promoting men.
This is why the productivity threshold of promotion is higher for women than for men.
Here we will brieﬂy present the basic features of the Lazear and Rosen model allowing
for human capital acquisition as in Gibbons and Waldman (1999). We then discuss the
implications of the model regarding gender diﬀerences in promotion rates, duration to
promotion, and productivity within tasks after the promotion decision.
2.1 Eﬃcient promotions
Consider workers who enter the labour market with some level of innate ability. While
working, they gradually acquire labour ma r k e te x p e r i e n c et h a ti n c r e a s e st h e i re ﬀective
ability. Denote the innate ability of a worker i with δi and the labour-market experience
prior to period t with xit. Following Gibbons and Waldman (1999), assume that the
eﬀective ability, ηit, of the worker is a function of innate ability and labour market
experience: ηit = δif(xit), where f0 > 0,f00 ≤ 0. Furthermore, assume that the initial
task assignment is done solely on the basis of innate ability so that on average, within
tasks, workers have the same ability when starting their career.
There are two tasks, A and B.T a s kA is more sensitive to worker’s eﬀective ability. We
focus on workers who have been assigned to task B and assume a 3-period long working
life. At period t all the workers are performing task B. At the end of the period the
employer observes the eﬀective ability of the workers and decides to select some workers
for promotion to task A.I np e r i o dt + 1 all the workers remain in task B but the ones
that are chosen to be promoted undergo costly training. In period t +2t h ep r o m o t e d
workers are assigned to task A, while the rest of the workers stay in task B.
The output per worker at period t is ηt = δf(xt). At period t + 1 the output of the
workers chosen for training is reduced to γ1ηt+1 = γ1δf(xt +1),whereγ1 < 1, while the
rest of the workers produce ηt+1 = δf(xt+1). Finally, in period t+2 the promoted workers
are assigned to the more productive task A where they produce γ2ηt+2 = γ2δf(xt +2 )
with γ2 > 1. The workers who remain in task B in period t+2 produce ηt+2 = δf(xt+2).
3Lazear and Rosen assume that the workers are sure to remain in the ﬁrm at periods
t and t + 1. However, at period t + 2 the workers are free to leave. Denote the value of
non-market time with ω and assume that it has a cumulative distribution function F(ω).
Naturally, the worker leaves at t + 2 if the value of non-market time exceeds the going
wage.
An eﬃcient promotion rule should induce workers to remain in the ﬁrm if the market
value of their output exceeds that of the non-market time. Furthermore, as there are
no externalities in this setting, the rule should choose only those workers for promotion
whose lifetime output is higher if promoted to more demanding tasks.
Social output for the workers who are chosen to be promoted to task A is equal to:







Correspondingly the social output for workers who remain on task B is:







The diﬀerence between (1) and (2) can be written as:




Workers are promoted to the task A if D(δ,x t) > 0 and they remain on task B if
D(δ,x t) < 0. Hence, there is a promotion threshold that can be written as:




The promotion decision is a function of the eﬀective ability of the worker. Thus for
each level of labour-market experience there is an innate ability threshold of promotion,
δ
∗, and for each level of innate ability there is a labour market experience threshold of
promotion, x∗
t.
2.2 Gender diﬀerences in outside options
Lazear and Rosen assume that the workers diﬀer in their outside options according to
gender so that the female distribution of the value of non-market time, Ff(ω), stochas-
tically dominates that of men, Fm(ω). Write the distribution of the value of non-market
time as F(ω;α)w h e r eα is a shifter such that ∂F/∂α > 0. Deﬁne Ff(ω) ≡ F(ω;αf)a n d
Fm(ω) ≡ F(ω;αm) and assume that αm > αf, which implies that Fm(ω) >F f(ω).












which is negative since ∂D(δ
∗,x t)/∂δ > 0. Thus α decreases the promotion threshold
value of innate ability δ




f. So women need
to have a higher level of innate ability than men in order to be promoted.














which is also negative since ∂D(δ,x ∗
t)/∂xt > 0. Thus we have that x∗
m <x ∗
f.W o m e n
also need a longer labour-market experience than men to be promoted.
42.3 Implications of gender diﬀerences in outside options
Gender diﬀerences in promotion thresholds have implications for promotion rates and the
distributions of eﬀective ability within tasks. First of all, it is straightforward to see that
because women have to meet higher requirements to be promoted, they are on average
less likely to be promoted. Thus, we should see that for each value of seniority women
are less likely to be promoted and that in order to be promoted women need to acquire
more seniority than men.
Second, the diﬀerential selection of men and women to promotion means that after the
promotion decision has taken place the male and female distributions of eﬀective ability
will no longer be identical within tasks. To see this, consider a cohort of workers who are
assigned to a given level of complexity and assume that some of them are promoted to a
more complex task in the next year by counterfactually applying an identical threshold
of eﬀective ability for both men and women. To impose the diﬀerential threshold implied
by the theory on these workers, we would have to move women from the low ability
end of the group of promoted workers to the group of even lower ability workers that
were not promoted. It is clear that the average ability of women would increase in both
groups whereas the average ability of men would remain unchanged. Thus, the diﬀerential
promotion threshold implies that women should be on average more productive both in
the groups of promoted and not-promoted workers.
In the following sections, we analyze both of these implications with the Finnish metal
industry data. We will ﬁrst brieﬂy replicate the familiar analysis of gender diﬀerences in
the promotion rates. We then use a set of measures of individual productivity to study
how the promotion process aﬀects the gender diﬀerences in productivity.
3 The data
The data come from the wage records of the Confederation of Finnish Industry and
Employers (Teollisuus ja ty¨ onantajat). The wage records contain detailed information
on the wages and working hours of all the workers who are employed in a ﬁrm that is
aﬃliated with the confederation. In the case of metal industry in Finland this covers
practically all the ﬁrms in the industry.
The wage records’ data on wages and working hours can be considered as exceptionally
reliable since in principle the information comes directly from the ﬁrms’ wage accounts.
However, the information on the individual characteristics is rather scarce. Basically
only age and gender can be identiﬁed from the raw data. Perhaps the most disturbing
piece of missing information are the variables concerning family status and the number
of children.
In the following analysis we will use a cross-sectional sample from 1990, that basi-
cally consists of every 15th worker in the 1990 metal industry worker population (5 167
workers), for the descriptive analysis. However, for the most part of the analysis we use
a sample of all the observations from 1990-2000 on every 15th worker who was hired in
the Finnish metal industry during 1990-1995. We chose to restrict the sample like this
because for the analysis of the promotion patterns it is essential to observe the workers
at their initial task assignments and follow them for a reasonable amount of years. This
newcomer panel has 8 679 employee/year observations on 2 309 workers of whom 603
(26%) are women. We have 5 541 episodes where both current and next year’s task are
observed and the worker stays within the same ﬁrm. These episodes involve 1 482 indi-
viduals of whom 392 are women. In table 1 we present the 1990 descriptive statistics on
this sample of workers for both men and women and compare them with the cross-section
in 1990.
53.1 Wage determination in the Finnish metal industry
We restricted the sample to include only workers from the metal industry because the
data on metal industry provide particularly interesting information on the complexity of
the tasks of an individual worker. The reason for this is the peculiar wage determination
mechanism in the Finnish metal industry. The employers and the trade union of the
industry have established a procedure that provides information on the complexity of
each job.
The general guidelines of the wage determination are set in the national level collective
agreement that is negotiated between the central employer organisation and the trade
union of the metal industry. According to the collective agreement wages should be
determined by the complexity of the job, individual performance of the worker, and by
various individual and ﬁrm-speciﬁc arrangements that lead to the ﬁnal hourly wage.
The complexity of the job speciﬁes a job-speciﬁc minimum wage for each worker. This
minimum wage is called the occupation-related wage. Worker’s individual performance
aﬀects the wage outcome through a personal bonus of 2 to 17% on top of the occupation-
related wage. An individual ﬁrm has considerable scope to choose its wage levels as long
as it stays above the minimum levels set by the collective agreement. It can choose from
two wage schemes: ﬁxed rates and piece rates.3
3.2 Job complexity
The complexity of the tasks is evaluated with a grading system that is similar to the ones
used in large establishments in the US. The evaluation of the tasks is carried out by a group
of specialists who consider various aspects of the jobs and assign them points according to
their complexity. The complexity level is based on three criteria: 1) how long does it take
to learn the tasks involved with the job, 2) what is the degree of responsibility involved
with the job, and 3) what are the working conditions. The outcome of the evaluation
should be independent of the characteristics of the workers performing the job and does
not therefore change when the individual on the job changes.
What is special to the grading system used in the Finnish metal industry is the fact
that this system is used in order to make the jobs comparable across ﬁrms. This is
fundamental for the wage determination process since the same rules should be applied
in all the ﬁrms in the industry.
Based on the evaluation of jobs, an occupation-related wage is determined for each job
in the collective agreement. The more demanding the job, that is the more complexity
points it gets, the higher is the corresponding occupation-related wage. Basically, there is
a one-to-one mapping from the occupation-related wages to the complexity points. The
occupation-related wages can therefore be interpreted as a continuous variable measuring
the complexity of the job. In our data we cannot observe the original complexity points
but for each worker we observe his or her occupation-related wage and we interpret this
as a measure of the complexity of his or her tasks in the wage space. There are typically
around 50 diﬀerent levels of occupation-related wages per year.
4 Complexity ladder of jobs
Occupation-related wages order the tasks according to their complexity. In this paper we
use this ordering of tasks as a job ladder where the movement from less to more complex
tasks within the ﬁrm is interpreted as a promotion. Here we provide evidence which in
our opinion justiﬁes the use of occupation-related wages as a job ladder.
















Figure 1: Allocation of workers across tasks of diﬀerent complexity, 1990 cross-section
First of all, it is important to remember that we measure complexity in the wage
space. After all, the occupation-related wages are a component of the ﬁn a lw a g eo ft h e
worker. This complicates the use of occupation-related wages as a measure of complexity.
There may be some year-to-year variation in the occupation-related wages that does not
reﬂect any real changes in the complexity of the tasks. All occupation-related wages are
increased in the bargaining rounds between the Metalworkers’ Union and the Industry’s
employer association with a general wage increase factor reﬂecting inﬂation and produc-
tivity growth. By analyzing the dynamics of occupation-related wages we are able to
correct for these changes. After this correction the occupation-related wages correspond
to real complexity in all the years.4
Figure 1 plots the allocation of male and female workers across complexity groups
in the 1990 cross-section. The complexity groups were constructed by aggregating the
occupation-related wages to integers. The ﬁgure reveals some important facts. First of
all, it is obvious that this is a male-dominated industry. This makes the generalization of
the results presented below somewhat tricky. In particular, we have to worry whether only
very ”bad” female workers self-select themselves to this industry. Actually, the striking
diﬀerence between the male and female distributions of complexity seem to indicate that
this is the case. Women are concentrated on the low end of the complexity axis while
men are dominant in the more complex tasks. This highlights the importance of focusing
on workers within similar kind of tasks, when studying gender diﬀerences.
Figure 1 is naturally a result of movements along the complexity ladder and initial
task assignments. To separate these two factors, the ﬁgure 2 plots the distributions of
newcomers in the 1990 cross-section. We interpret these observations as the initial task
assignments of the workers. The same pattern is repeated here. Women tend to start in
jobs of lower complexity than men.
Our aim is to study, whether advancing to more demanding tasks is more diﬃcult for
women than for men who start in similar tasks. To study this, we have to be sure that we
can interpret the complexity levels as a real job ladder. After all, complexity could be an
irrelevant attribute of the job and workers may move between tasks of diﬀerent complexity












Figure 2: Allocation of workers across tasks of diﬀerent complexity at the initial assign-
ment, 1990 cross-section
without a clear pattern. This is why it is important to look at the patterns of job-to-job
transitions. If complexity levels really are a true job ladder, the movements up and down
this ladder should more or less correspond to the stylized facts concerning promotions
and demotions. Basically we should see clearly more promotions than demotions and
promotions should not to skip many levels.
Table 2 is a job-to-job transition matrix similar to the ones in Baker et al (1994) and
in Treble et al (2001). It shows all the within-ﬁrm transitions between complexity groups
including the entries, exits, and stays as percentages of movements from a complexity
group to another between 1990 and 1991 cross-sections. Altogether 3 823 workers re-
mained in the same ﬁrm during 1990-1991. In 1990, 782 workers entered the industry
and 957 left it.
Shaded areas indicate the levels that were the most frequent destinations of the
complexity-level movers. It is clear that most of the workers stay within the level they
were assigned to. This is especially true at the higher end of the complexity axis. How-
ever, there are a considerable number of upward movements and these rarely leap over
many levels. On the other hand, downward movement is rare. All in all, the information
in table 2 seems to correspond more or less to the stylized facts regarding promotions and
demotions. It seems appropriate to interpret the complexity axis as a job ladder.
5G e n d e r d i ﬀerences in promotion
We now use this complexity ladder of jobs to study gender diﬀerences in promotion
patterns. If the promotion threshold is higher for women, we should see less women
moving up the job ladder. In this section, we examine gender diﬀerences in the change of
t h ec o m p l e x i t yo ft h et a s k sa sw e l la sd u r a t i o nt op r o m o t i o n .
5.1 Change in complexity
An attractive feature of using the occupation-related wage as a measure of the complexity
of tasks is that it is a continuous variable. A change in the occupation-related wage
8conveniently measures a change in the tasks of the worker. We interpret a positive within-
ﬁrm change in the worker’s occupation-related wage as a promotion and a negative change
as a demotion. Furthermore, continuity allows us to measure the extent of promotions and
demotions which would not be possible with a binary indicator of promotions commonly
used in empirical studies.
In table 3 we present regression results that were obtained with our sample of new-
comers who entered the metal industry during 1990-1995 and who are followed until 2000.
This sample is particularly suitable for the analysis of promotion patterns because the
complexity of each worker’s initial task assignment can be observed.
In column 1, we simply regress the change in the logarithm of the worker’s occupation-
related wage on a gender dummy. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the male
and female sample means of change in complexity. The introduction of a set of controls
for individual and ﬁr mc h a r a c t e r i s t i c sa sw e l la se ﬀo r t — r e l a t e dv a r i a b l e s ,i nc o l u m n2 ,
makes the coeﬃcient on the female dummy slightly more positive. However, as soon as
we introduce a control for the complexity of the worker’s initial task assignment (i.e.
logarithm of the worker’s initial occupation-related wage and it’s square) in column 3,
the coeﬃcient on female dummy is negative, -0.006, and clearly signiﬁcant.
The results in the third column of table 3 do not account for the endogeneity of
the initial task assignment. After all, according to the theoretical discussion above, the
initial task assignments are done on the basis of initial ability that we do not observe. In
table 4, we report the estimated coeﬃcients of the female dummy from regressions within
groups of initial task complexity, using the same set of controls as in the second column
of table 3. The groups were constructed by aggregating the occupation-related wages of
the initial task assignments to integers. If one is willing to assume that the initial ability
is more or less ﬁxed within groups of complexity of the initial task assignment, then the
endogeneity problem should be alleviated in these regressions. As can be seen from table
4, the coeﬃcient on the female dummy is negative and signiﬁcant in almost all the groups
where women are usually employed.
5.2 Duration to promotion
In order to study duration to promotion, we deﬁned a promotion indicator that takes
a value of one if the individual experienced a positive change in the occupation-related
wage within the same ﬁrm and zero otherwise. Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survivor
function (not reported here) showed that female survivor function was consistently above
the male one and a straightforward log-rank test for the equality of the Kaplan-Meier
estimates rejected the null with a p-value of 0.029.
In table 5, we present the results from the estimation of Cox proportional-hazards
model of promotion, using the same co-variates as in the OLS analysis of the change
in occupation-related wages in tables 3 and 4.5 In column 1 we present results from a
model that omits the complexity of the initial task assignment. The estimated coeﬃcient
on the female dummy is not signiﬁcant. This situation changes once we control for
the complexity of the initial task assignment in column 2. The coeﬃcient of the female-
dummy (-0.4) is clearly signiﬁcant. In columns 3-5 of table 6 we estimate the proportional
hazards model within subsamples where the workers were divided into ”low-complexity”,
”medium-complexity”, and ”low-complexity” groups according to the complexity of their
initial task assignment. Women have clearly lower hazards of promotion in the low and
medium groups of initial task complexity.
We interpret the results presented in this section as implying that women are initially
assigned to tasks where promotions are more frequent. However, compared to male
5We treated each seniority spell prior to promotion as an observation on a separate individual.
9workers, who have been assigned to those same tasks, women’s opportunities to advance
to more complex tasks are clearly worse.6 Women take, on average, clearly smaller steps
on the complexity ladder than men who start in similar tasks. Furthermore, women have
to acquire more years of seniority than men to move upwards on the complexity ladder.
6 Promotions and the gender productivity gap
Like many other authors, we ﬁnd support for the claim that women are less likely to be
promoted than men. As was discussed in the second section, there is also another way
of looking at the asymmetric promotion threshold hypothesis, namely by comparing the
relative performance of identical men and women before and after promotion.
Assuming that the initial ability distributions of newly hired men and women are
identical, the asymmetric promotion threshold implies that on average women should be
more able than men, both among the workers who are promoted and among those who
are not. In the Lazear and Rosen model this means that women should earn higher wages
than men in both of these groups. Such a ”strong version” of the asymmetric promotion
threshold hypothesis has, as far as we know, never been observed. It is easy to imagine
that many intervening variables, such as ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage policies and eventual wage
discrimination, make it diﬃcult to design a reliable test for such a hypothesis, at least if
inferences are to be made on the basis of wage data alone.7 Furthermore, it is of course
conceivable that the initial ability distributions do diﬀer.
A reasonable but weaker version of the asymmetric promotion threshold hypothesis
would say that average performance of women should improve relatively with respect
to that of men after the promotions have taken place. Thus, if we could measure the
productivity of all the new workers at their initial task assignment and then repeat this
measurement after some of these workers have been promoted, women should have nar-
rowed the productivity gap with respect to men among the workers that remain in their
initial tasks as well as among the workers who have been promoted to new tasks. In
this section, we use data on personal bonuses and ﬁnal wage outcomes to examine these
hypotheses.
6.1 Personal bonuses and promotions
In the Finnish metal industry the worker’s personal achievement on the task should aﬀect
his or her wage through a personal bonus that is one of the components of the ﬁnal wage.
This personal bonus can vary from 2 % to 17 % of the occupation-related wage and it is
assigned to the worker by his or her immediate supervisor. According to the collective
agreement, the personal bonus should be determined by the worker’s ability to cope with
the requirements of the task and by the worker’s output relative to what is considered
ordinary in the task. Here, we use these bonuses as a measure of individual productivity.
Naturally, the use of subjective performance evaluations as productivity measures is
problematic. For example, Harris and Holmstr¨ om (1982) as well as Gibbons and Wald-
man (1999) criticize the use of such indicators because it is not clear what comparison
group supervisor’s use when evaluating individual workers. In general, the performance
evaluations should always be conditioned on the job category and seniority.
However, we believe that in our case the use of personal bonuses as a productivity
6Not surprisingly, also results from more familiar probit-equations of promotion (not presented here)
conﬁrm this reasoning.
7Lazear and Rosen (1990, pp 120-121) ﬁnd this particular prediction of their model to be ”at odds
with available evidence”.
10measure makes sense.8 First of all, the spirit of the collective agreement is that personal
bonuses should be based on relative comparisons within tasks. The intention is to avoid
a situation where high bonuses would be paid only to workers in some tasks, such as
high-complexity jobs where the most able workers are likely to work. Thus, one should
observe workers at all levels of personal bonuses in all the tasks. Furthermore, bonus
payments should not depend on the ﬁrm’s external demand conditions but employers
should use the whole scale of bonuses every year. Personal bonuses are not intended to
be a way of proﬁt-sharing that is done only in good years. To enforce these requirements,
the collective agreement actually dictates that personal bonuses should be distributed
symmetrically around the mean of 9.5% within tasks of similar complexity in the ﬁrm.9
Thus, the performance evaluation in the Finnish metal industry is conditioned on the
task. Second, our sample of workers who enter the metal industry during 1990-1995
makes it straightforward to compare workers within categories of actual seniority.
Our idea is to study whether men and women face diﬀerent promotion thresholds by
looking at the distributions of personal bonuses for a given group of new employees, both
at the initial assignment and after an eventual promotion. More speciﬁcally, we selected
the workers who enter the metal industry between years 1990-1995. Using the job ladder
described above, we can then partition that set of workers into two subsets: those who
have got a promotion up to some speciﬁc year (the “promoted” group) and those who
have stayed at the initial assignment until that year (the “stagnant” group).
In table 6 we report the mean bonuses for workers in each of these groups. In the
ﬁrst row we display the mean bonuses of the new entrants during the ﬁrst year. We see
that men and women get approximately equal assessments during that initial year. The
next row depicts the mean bonus of men and women as measured in the next career
year, separately for those who were promoted after the initial year and those who were
not. The following row depicts the mean bonuses two years after the initial assignment,
similarly diﬀerentiated between those who had been promoted up to their third year of
activity and those who were not; and analogously for the fourth row. The salient result
in table 6 seems to be that the female bonuses dominate in both groups, precisely as we
would expect if the female threshold is higher. The diﬀerences also tend to be statistically
signiﬁcant among the promoted workers.
In order to have a broader view on the distributions, we plot kernel estimators of the
distributions of personal bonuses for men and women in ﬁgure 3, both at the initial task
assignment and after 1 year of seniority, separately for stagnant and promoted workers.10
T h em a l ea n df e m a l ed i s t r i b u t i o n so fp e r s o n a lb onuses are almost indistinguishable at the
initial task assignment. However, after the ﬁrst year the female distribution of personal
bonuses is clearly shifted to the right with respect to the male distribution in the group
of promoted workers.
Thus, personal bonus comparisons deliver a very clear message. If one is willing to
accept bonuses as a measure of individual productivity, the results in table 6 and in ﬁgure
3 give support to the ”strong version” of the asymmetric promotion threshold hypothesis:
there are no signiﬁcant productivity diﬀerences between men and women at the initial
task assignment but women are more productive in absolute terms among promoted and
8Medoﬀ and Abraham (1980) and Flabbi and Ichino (2001) defend the use of performance evaluation
data by showing that in their cases high evaulations predict promotions. According to table 3 this seems
t ob et h ec a s eh e r ea sw e l l .
9To some extent, this is observed in the data. The distribution of bonuses does not change a lot from
year to year and in large ﬁrms the bonuses are distributed more or less symmetricaly in tasks of similar
complexity.
10The estimation was done using Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of .025. Diﬀerent bandwidths
were tried without relevant changes in the qualitative results. The ﬁgures for 2, 3, and 4 years after the
initial task assignment were very similar.
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Figure 3: Kernel density estimates of the distribution of personal bonuses
non-promoted workers.
6.2 Hourly wage gap and promotions
As was explained in section 3, there is considerable variation in the ﬁnal-hourly wages
on top of the occupational-related wages and personal bonuses. Most of the workers
earn hourly wages that are higher than the sum of the occupation-related wages and
personal bonuses. It is obvious that this surplus in ﬁn a lw a g e si sa l s oa ﬀected by worker’s
individual productivity. This information can be used to provide additional evidence on
the relationship of the gender productivity gap and the promotion process.
In order to use this variation in ﬁnal hourly wages as a measure of individual produc-
tivity, we have to condition it on the tasks of the worker and on ﬁrm-speciﬁcf a c t o r s ,s u c h
as production technology and wage schemes. Thus, we calculate the diﬀerence between
the ﬁnal wage and the sum of the occupation-related wages and personal bonuses. The
conditioning on the task is done by taking the ratio of this diﬀerence and the occupation-
related wage. To account for ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors, we measure this ratio as a deviation
from the ﬁrm-speciﬁcm e a n .W ec a l lt h i sm e a s u r eo fp r o d u c t i v i t yt h eindividual hourly
wage surplus.
Table 7 reports an analogous comparison to that of table 6, this time carried out for
the individual ﬁxed-rate hourly wage surpluses. We chose to use the ﬁx e d - r a t ew a g e sa sa
performance measure, since the ﬁxed-rate scheme is the most common wage scheme and
most workers have positive ﬁxed-rate hours.11 I no r d e rt oh a v ear e l i a b l ee s t i m a t eo ft h e
ﬁxed-rate hourly wages for each worker, we left out of this comparison the workers who
had very low number of hours (less than 50 per quarter) of ﬁxed-rate work. Consequently,
the selection of workers diﬀers slightly from that of table 7.
The results in table 7 follow the same pattern as in table 6 with some interesting
diﬀerences. At the initial task assignment women seem to perform worse with respect
to the ﬁrm-mean than men. The promotion process decreases this gender gap in the
stagnant group of workers and reverses the sign among promoted workers. The standard
11Unfortunately, there were not enough workers with positive piece-rate hours in this sample to conduct
any meaningful comparison with piece-rate wages.
12Stagnant workers, seniority = 1
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Figure 4: Kernel density estimates of the distribution of hourly wage surpluses
errors of the estimates of the diﬀerences are fairly large, so that we ﬁnd signiﬁcant gen-
der diﬀerences only at some levels of seniority. However, it is important to note that
the signiﬁcant diﬀerence in favour of men at the initial task assignment is reduced to
insigniﬁcant diﬀerences among the stagnant workers and reversed to signiﬁcant or close
to signiﬁcant diﬀerences in favour of women in the group of promoted workers.
In ﬁgure 4, we plot the kernel estimates of the distributions of the hourly wage sur-
pluses in the same way as in ﬁgure 3. These pictures tell a clearer story than the simple
mean comparisons. The initial female distribution of hourly wage surpluses is to the
left of the male one. However, after the promotion decision has been taken the female
distribution seems to dominate that of men among the group of promoted workers, just
as observed in the case of personal bonuses above.
We interpret these results as support for the ”weak version” of the asymmetric promo-
tion threshold hypothesis: women seem to perform worse at the initial task assignment
but as a result of promotion process they catch up some of this diﬀerence in the stagnant
group and overcome men in the promoted group.
6.3 Gender productivity gap and separations
Both of our individual productivity measures seem to indicate that women improve their
relative position in the groups of promoted and not-promoted workers as a result of the
promotion process. These results can be interpreted as evidence on asymmetric promotion
threshold. Because women need to overcome a higher productivity threshold, they will
be on average more productive both among the workers that are selected for promotion
and the workers who remain in their previous tasks.
H o w e v e r ,t h et y p eo fg e n d e rd i ﬀerences in productivity seen above can also be gen-
erated by separations. If exceptionally productive male workers or unproductive female
workers leave the ﬁrm after the ﬁrst years of seniority, we would see similar gender dif-
ferences in productivity as above. There are reasons to make such a case. Topel and
Ward (1992), for example, show that the early careers of young men involve a number
of separations that account for a signiﬁcant part of the wage growth during these years.
Productive male workers may receive better outside oﬀe r st h a nw o m e na n dl e a v et h eﬁrm.
13On the other hand, it is well known that female workers are less attached to the labour
market. This problem may be particularly severe with a male-dominant industry such as
ours. Thus, lower than average female workers may leave the industry altogether after
the ﬁrst years of seniority.
In our data we observe two kinds of movement away from the ﬁrms that can be
used to check the robustness of the productivity gap results in tables 6 and 7: there are
workers who leave the industry and workers who move from one ﬁrm to another within
the industry.12 Movement of the ﬁrst type is much more common in our data with an
incidence rate of 0.17 (0.16 for men and 0.19 for women). Firm-to-ﬁrm movement is
relatively rare. The incidence rate is only 0.03. Curiously, the incidence of ﬁrm-to-ﬁrm
movement is slightly lower for men, 0.029, than for women, 0.04.
In table 8, we present results from Cox proportional hazards models of leaving the
industry and ﬁrm-to-ﬁr mm o v e m e n t .T h ec o - v a r i a t e sa r et h es a m eo n e sa si nt a b l e5w i t h
ﬁxed rate hourly wage surplus as an additional explanatory variable. Women seem to be
slightly more likely to leave the industry, but there are no signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences
in movement between ﬁrms. Interestingly, our productivity measures - personal bonuses
and the hourly wage surplus - do not have a signiﬁcant on the overall likelihood of leaving,
apart from the negative eﬀect of hourly wage surpluses on the ﬁrm-to-ﬁrm movement.
H o w e v e r ,t h er e s u l t si nt a b l e8d on o tt e l la n y t h i n ga b o u tt h ep r o d u c t i v i t yo ft h o s e
male and female workers who decide to leave the metal industry or change ﬁrms within
the metal industry. Ideally, we would like to know whether the productivity diﬀerence
between staying and leaving workers is less negative or more positive among women than
among men. We are thus interested in the gender diﬀerence in the productivity diﬀerence
between staying and leaving workers. In tables 9 and 10 we examine these diﬀerences with
respect to workers leaving the metal industry and workers who change the ﬁrm within the
metal industry, using both personal bonuses and ﬁxed hourly wage surpluses as measures
of individual productivity.
In the panel A of table 9, we report the mean personal bonuses of workers who stay in
the ﬁrm and who leave the metal industry before the next year and the diﬀerence between
these workers among men and women. The last column reports the diﬀerence between the
male and female diﬀerences. If productivity diﬀerences were driven by leaving workers, we
would expect this number to be mostly negative and signiﬁcant. Panel B reports a similar
decomposition using the ﬁxed rate hourly wage surpluses as a measure of productivity.
The last rows of both panels report the total diﬀerences in the pooled data. The numbers
in table 9 do not point to any systematic diﬀerences.
Table 10 reports the results from a similar decomposition, this time conducted with
respect to workers who change ﬁrms within the metal industry. In this case, there is
somewhat clearer pattern to the numbers. The productivity diﬀerence seems to be smaller
between staying and changing men than among women. However, these diﬀerences are
not statistically signiﬁcant, apart from few cases.
We ﬁnd it diﬃcult to see the results in tables 9 and 10 as indicating that the selection
of leaving workers could account for the consistent pattern in productivity diﬀerences
among promoted and non-promoted workers reported in tables 6 and 7. There are some
interesting diﬀerences in the productivity diﬀerentials of staying and leaving men and
women but there is no consistent pattern that would imply that particularly productive
men and unproductive women leave their jobs after the ﬁrst few years of seniority. Finally,
we repeated the comparisons in tables 6 and 7 with a group of workers who stayed with the
same employer for at least four years. The results (not reported here) were qualitatively
unchanged.
12Movement outside the industry involves workers who leave the labour force alltogether as well as
workers who change the industry. Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish these two types of movements.
147 Conclusions
One of the most common explanations for gender diﬀerences in job assignments and pro-
motion patterns is the comparative advantage that women have in non-market activities
with respect to men. Because of this comparative advantage, female reservation wages
are higher than the male ones and women have to meet higher productivity requirements
than men to be promoted. This is the reasoning in the model of Lazear and Rosen (1990)
discussed in the second section. If men and women in the same tasks have more or less
same productivity initially, the diﬀerential promotion threshold implies that women will
be less likely to be and that promoted and not-promoted women will be on average more
productive than their male counterparts in the corresponding groups.
The Finnish metal industry data are exceptionally suitable for the analysis of pro-
motions. They provide a task metric that is valid for both within and between ﬁrm
comparisons and that is linked to the actual task contents. Furthermore, the data pro-
vide variables that can be used to study the productivity implications of the asymmetric
promotion process.
We ﬁnd that women are allocated in less complex tasks than men. This diﬀerence
is clearly visible already at the initial task assignment. Furthermore, women are pro-
moted less often than men. This result holds both when we measure the promotion as
a continuous variable and as a binary variable. Thus, women move up the complexity
ladder less than men who start on similar kind of tasks. Furthermore, the results from
proportional-hazards models imply that women have to wait longer in order to move up
at all.
Promoted women are on average more productive than promoted men. This results
holds if we use either performance evaluations or ﬁnal hourly wages as a measure of
individual productivity although the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences vary. Furthermore,
there is some evidence that women tend to be on average more productive in the group
of not-promoted workers as well. We interpret these results as supporting the hypothesis
that women face a higher promotion threshold than men.
All in all, these results seem to indicate that women have to pass higher productivity
thresholds to be promoted. What the results also highlight is the importance of the initial
task assignments. On average, the gender diﬀerences are not at all clear in these data. It
is only when the initial task assignments are controlled for that gender diﬀerences arise.
Typically job outcomes are results of both initial assignments and subsequent promotions.
We believe that the ability to distinguish between these two phenomena is important when
studying gender diﬀerences in promotion patterns.
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Figure 5: Yearly distributions of occupation-related wages 1990-2000
8 Appendix
The problem with using occupation-related wages as a measure of the complexity of the
tasks is that they are increased in some years by general growth factor that is not related
to real changes in tasks. Figure A1 plots the yearly distributions of occupation-related
wages and reveals that in some years the whole distribution of the occupation-related
wages shifts. It is clear that complexity of the tasks cannot undergo such changes. Thus,
in order to use the occupation-related wages as measure of the complexity of the tasks
we need to clean away these changes.
We corrected the occupation-related wages from this kind of changes by constructing
two year samples of workers who (i) were present in both years t and t + 1, (ii) who did
not change their occupational code, (iii) and who did not change the ﬁrm between the
two years. Thus, we ended up with 10 separate samples of workers with two observations
per worker in each. The idea of this was to have samples of workers who remained in the
same tasks in years t and t + 1 and to observe the changes in their occupation-related
wages.
We grouped the workers in each two-year sample according to their occupation-related
wages in year t and analyzed the distributions of year-to-year changes in occupation-
related wages of each group. This analysis revealed that for the most of the workers
within a group the year-to-year changes in occupation-related wages were identical. Thus,
we interpreted the group mode of the change of occupation-related wage as the increase
in occupation-related wage that is not related to changes in the tasks. All the rest of the
changes were interpreted as a change in tasks.
The occupation-related wages were then corrected in order to make them correspond
to complexity by substracting from each occupation-related wage the mode of the change
of the occupation-related wage of the workers with the same value of occupation-related























Figure 6: Yearly distributions of complexity 1990-2000
18Table 1 Descriptive statistics









Age 30.72 10.96 33.06 9.90 37.45 10.22 40.19 10.28
Complexity 33.05 3.24 29.69 2.72 35.17 3.08 30.50 2.58
Bonus 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.04
Fixed-rate
wage
40.34 7.31 33.89 4.90 45.15 12.38 36.63 5.38
Piece-rate
wage
50.57 12.32 37.93 6.04 53.45 11.98 41.68 6.09
Share of piece
rate
0.36 0.43 0.34 0.42 0.48 0.45 0.47 0.44
Share of
overtime
0.04 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.04




Our sample consists of all the observations during 1990-2000 on approximately every 15
th who enters the metal industry during 1990-1995. The descriptive statistics are 1990
means and standard deviations. 1990 cross-section consists of every 15th worker workers in the metal industry population in 1990. Complexity refers to the occupation-
related wage in FIM 1990. Bonus is reported as a proportion of occupation-related wage. Fixed-rate and piece-rate wages are hourly wages in the corresponding schemes in
FIM 1990. Share of piece rate is the proportion of total hours worked in the piece rate scheme and the share of overtime similarly for overtime hours.Table 2 Transition matrix between jobs for newcomers in the metal industry, 1990-1991
Exit 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 Total N
Entry 4,7 3,7 9,0 7,3 4,6 16,2 10,7 3,8 9,3 13,8 5,2 5,2 2,0 1,8 2,4 100 782
26 34,8 52,2 0,7 9,4 0,7 . 0,7 1,4 . . . . . . . . 100 138
27 37,5 1,6 46,9 6,3 . . 4,7 . . . 3,1 . . . . . 100 64
28 30,7 1,2 0,4 59,5 3,1 1,2 1,9 0,8 . 0,4 0,4 0,4 . . . . 100 257
29 27,7 0,4 . 1,5 63,8 0,4 3,3 2,6 . 0,4 . . . . . . 100 271
30 28,9 . . 0,7 . 59,3 7,4 . 2,2 . 1,5 . . . . . 100 135
31 26,9 . 0,2 0,4 1,3 0,2 62,1 4,9 1,6 1,6 0,4 0,2 0,4 . . . 100 554
32 23,2 . . . 0,4 0,2 1,9 62,3 0,8 8,5 1,9 . 0,8 . . . 100 483
33 17,3 . . . . 0,8 0,8 . 74,0 0,8 2,8 3,1 . 0,4 . . 100 254
34 18,5 . . . . . 0,6 2,2 . 66,6 9,5 0,4 1,6 . 0,6 . 100 497
35 16,7 . . 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,5 1,0 2,6 68,4 2,8 6,0 0,5 0,9 0,1 100 797
36 16,9 . . . . . 0,4 . 0,4 . 4,6 72,2 . 4,6 0,4 0,7 100 284
37 12,9 . . . . . 0,7 0,2 . 2,0 7,4 . 72,3 0,2 4,2 . 100 404
38 10,8 . . . . . . . . . 1,0 2,1 . 82,5 . 3,6 100 194
39 10,2 . . . . . . . . . 1,1 . 6,8 . 81,8 . 100 264
40 7,6 . . . . . . . 0,5 . 2,2 1,6 . 2,7 1,6 83,7 100 184
Total 20,0 1,6 0,7 3,7 4,0 1,9 8,2 7,4 4,5 8,7 14,0 5,1 7,8 3,8 5,2 3,4 100 4780
Shows all transitions between complexity levels, including entry, exit, and stays from 1990 to 1991, as percentage of movements from a complexity level to another.
Aggregating occupation-related wages into integers creates complexity levels. Shaded cells indicate the level that was the most frequent destination of the complexity level
moves. Numbers in boxed cells indicate stays within a complexity level. Zeros denote nonempty cells that round up to zero and “.”s denote empty cells.Table 3 Change in complexity – regression results
































































Initial task complexity - - -.3769
(.3109)
(Initial task complexity)








2 .0001 .0550 .0785
N 5 541 5 541 5 541
Dependent variable is the difference between log of the occupation-related wage in the next period and
the log of the occupation-related wage at the current period. Seniority measured as number of years that
individual has been present in the metal industry. Newcomer is a dummy that takes value one at the
first observation on individual. Personal bonus is measured as a proportion of occupation-related wage.
Piece-rate share is measure as a ratio of hours worked on piece rate. Overtime share is the ratio of hours
worked on overtime. Initial task complexity is the log of the occupation-related wage at the initial task
assignment. Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors.Table 4 Change in complexity – Regression results from within initial task complexity-groups
regressions
Initial task complexity-group Coefficient on gender
dummy
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The numbers in the second column are the estimated coefficients of the female dummy from within
group regressions of the within firm change of the logarithm of the occupation-related wages on gender
dummy and the same set of co-variates as in the second column of table 3. The groups were
constructed by aggregating the occupation-related wages of the workers’ initial task assignments to
integers. The third column reports the sample size of each regression, and the fourth column reports the
percentage of female workers in each group.Table 5 Duration to promotion – Cox proportional hazards estimates. The newcomer sample.
Coefficients
























































































































N 5 624 5 624 1 589 3 232 803
Estimates from a proportional-hazards model of a positive change in log occupation-related wage. Newcomer is a dummy that takes value one at the first observation on
individual. Personal bonus is measured as a proportion of occupation-related wage. Piece-rate share is measured as a ratio of hours worked on piece rate. Overtime share is
the ratio of hours worked on overtime. Initial task complexity is the log of the occupation-related wage at the initial task assignment. Numbers in parenthesis are standard
errors. Low complexity group consists of workers whose initial task complexity was not higher than 30. Medium complexity group consists of workers whose initial task















































































Stagnant refers to the group of workers that are not promoted. The second row reports the average
bonuses of men and women at the initial task assignment. In the rows 3-6 these workers are split into
two groups according to whether they were promoted or not and the means of bonuses are reported for
each group. N refers to the sample size of the cell.














































































Stagnant refers to the group of workers that are not promoted. The second row reports the average ratio
of final fixed-rate hourly wage and the sum of occupation-related wage and bonus as a deviation from
firm mean for men and women at the initial task assignment. In the rows 3-6 these workers are split
into two groups according to whether they were promoted or not and the means of final fixed-rate wage
surpluses as deviations from firm means are reported for each group.Table 8 Duration to industry and firm-to-firm exit – Cox proportional hazards estimates. The
newcomer sample.
Coefficients





















































N 4 941 4 408
Estimates from a proportional-hazards model of a worker leaving the metal industry and worker
moving from one firm to another within the metal industry. Newcomer is a dummy that takes value one
at the first observation on individual. Personal bonus is measured as a proportion of occupation-related
wage. Piece-rate share is measured as a ratio of hours worked on piece rate. Overtime share is the ratio
of hours worked on overtime. Initial task complexity is the log of the occupation-related wage at the
initial task assignment. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.Table 9 Productivity comparisons of workers who stay in the firm and workers who leave the metal industry

































































































































Staying refers to workers who stay in the firm in the following year. Exiting refers to workers who leave the industry between the current and the following year. Male-
female Dif-in-Dif refers to the difference between 4
th and 7
th columns.Table 10 Productivity comparisons of workers who stay in the firm and workers who change firms in the metal industry



































































































































Staying refers to workers who stay in the firm in the following year. Changing refers to workers who change the firm within the industry between the current and the
following year. Male-female Dif-in-Dif refers to the difference between 4
th and 7
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